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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the situation where children are born in New Zealand to illegal 
immigrants. The paper specifically looks at the conflict between the rights of the 
citizen and the rights of the State. Firstly the New Zealand Immigration Service 
policy guidelines are considered, which introduce the rights of both parties. New 
Zealand domestic legislation is considered, specifically the Immigration Act 1987, 
the Citizenship Act 1977 and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The paper 
also identifies the relevant international instruments and considers the application 
of applicable articles in the immigration context. The paper then looks at the role 
of international instruments in decisions and whether they create either a 
mandatory relevant consideration or a legitimate expectation and what this means 
in the immigration context. Different categories of rights holders are identified, 
and the rights each party has. Finally changes to citizenship and immigration 
policy are formulated to solve the immigration problem. This paper concludes that 
in the current environment, children born to illegal immigrants have no real option 
to stay in New Zealand and so they must leave New Zealand with their illegal 
immigrant parents. 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and 
annexures) comprises approximately 14,500 words. 
4 
I INTRODUCTION 
People are seeking to come to New Zealand in greater numbers than ever, either on 
a temporary or permanent basis.' Inevitably, some of these immigrants will 
become overstayers as a permit expires, and they fail to leave New Zealand or gain 
New Zealand residence. These illegal immigrants will be served with removal 
orders from the New Zealand Immigration Service (NZIS). 
The problem that exists in many cases is that illegal immigrants have New Zealand 
born children while they are in New Zealand. These children are New Zealand 
citizens by the Citizenship Act 1977. The illegal immigrants then seek to rely on 
their children's status as New Zealand citizens to preclude their removal from New 
Zealand. This introduces a conflict between the rights of the state to determine 
who can reside in New Zealand and the rights of the citizen children to remain in 
New Zealand. The focus of this paper will principally be on the rights of the 
children to stay in New Zealand, not those of the parents. The conflict of rights 
exists because the children have a right to remain in New Zealand and cannot be 
removed, by virtue of citizenship. The parents have no such right. But in essence 
removal of the parents results in 'removal' of the children. This could be argued to 
be an infringement of the children's rights. 
This paper will seek to explore the balance between the rights of the state and 
citizen in more detail. In this regard, the scope of the paper will be limited to 
situations where persons have arrived in New Zealand and have become illegal 
immigrants; predominately from Pacific Island nations. 2 These immigrants have 
1 Numbers of short-term passenger arrivals for the year ended March 1998 were 1,464,766. During 
1999 there was 1,51 7,324. During 2000 there was 1,648,988 . Statistics New Zealand Key Statistics 
August 2000 (Statistics ew Zealand, Wellington, 2000) 23. 
2 Statistics for the year up to August 1994 show the source countries with the highest number of 
overstayers were Samoa with 30 per cent and Tonga with 19 per cent. Mismatch Numbers 
(Overstayers) by Nationality at given date. 
<http://www.immigration.govt.nz/research and information/>. These results are also shown in 
current statistics, overstayers from Samoa are 27 per cent of total overstayers and from Tonga 25 
per cent. "Last-chance amnesty for overstayers" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand 20 
September 2000, 1. 
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had New Zealand citizen children in the interim. Children' s citizenship should not 
demand that the parents be allowed to stay in New Zealand. In view of the vast 
number of cases before the courts on this issue, the paper will be restricted to those 
before the Court of Appeal and those in the High Court raising points of particular 
importance. 
Part II of this paper will introduce the NZIS policy guidelines that were revised as 
a consequence of criticism of the situation in Tavita v Minister of Immigration. 
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Part III will set out the domestic law on the point which creates the children's 
citizenship and right of residence in New Zealand. Part IV will look at the relevant 
international instruments and their application in the immigration context. Part V 
will look at the conflict between state and citizen, in particular the rights of each 
party. Finally Part VI will suggest any viable changes in immigration or 
citizenship policies that are appropriate before immigration creates a real problem 
for the nation. 
II NZIS IMMIGRATION POLICY 
New Zealand has had a targeted immigration policy smce 1991, which was 
designed to attract quality immigrants.4 The process is based on a points system 
where the qualities of potential immigrants are ranked according to set criteria and 
given an overall point result. This result must reach the point pass mark for 
residency to be granted. The pass mark is announced weekly to meet the set 
immigration targets .5 This system excludes many applications from Pacific Island 
persons, because the required standard is so high. 6 The policy was targeted to 
highly educated persons who could contribute to the economic growth of New 
3 Tavita v Minister of !111111igratio11 [1994] 2 ZLR 257 (CA) [Tavita]. 
4 Ruth SJ Farmer " ew Zea land 's 'Targeted ' Immigration Policy, 1991 to 1996" ( 1997) 5(1) 
People & Place 1, 3. 
5 New Zealand Immigration Service /111111igration Policy Guidelines (New Zealand Immigration 
Service, Wellington, 2000) R6.20 [NZIS] . 
6 Farmer, above n 4, 8. 
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Zealand. 7 Thus many Pacific Island immigrants rely on temporary entry to New 
Zealand. 
The Court of Appeal criticised the NZIS 's treatment of the situation in Tavita8 
where the rights of a New Zealand born child were not considered when removing 
an illegal immigrant father. A specific format was then developed to deal with all 
immigration decisions to avoid further adverse comments. The guidelines 
represent the protocol to be followed when assessing immigration applications and 
enforcing removals. 
The guidelines start from the proposition that decisions must be made in 
accordance with fairness and natural justice.9 This means that all decisions are 
dealt with consistently. Temporary entry permits and visas are not granted as of 
right, but as a matter of discretion 10 and the guidelines set the required 
considerations. Applicants must be bona fide and intending a truly temporary stay 
in New Zealand, they must not be likely to breach the conditions of the permit, nor 
remain in New Zealand unlawfully. 11 The NZIS is fully aware of the current 
problem of illegal immigrants and considers this when deciding applications. 
Temporary entry can be for employment, visitation or study and is for a maximum 
initial stay of four years. 12 
In the situations of the cases to be discussed, the parents legally gained temporary 
entry to New Zealand. However, their permits then expired and they became 
illegal immigrants. Such persons are obligated to leave New Zealand on or before 
the date their pern1it expires. 13 The NZIS will conduct investigations with the 
objective to maintain the integrity of New Zealand's immigration law and policy, 
by ensuring that breaches are dealt with in accordance with this law and policy. 
7 NZIS, above n 5, Rla. 
8 Tavita, above 11 3, 266. 
9 NZIS, above n 5, Al.lb. 
10 Inunigration Act 1987 s 10 and NZIS, above n 5, E3.3.10. 
11 NZIS, above 11 5, ES. I. 
12 NZIS, above n 5, E3.5.5. 
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The NZIS proceeds on the footing that the principle is to uphold New Zealand's 
immigration law under the Immigration Act 1987 and the protocol developed by 
the NZIS for approval or rejection of permits. Prima facie illegal immigrants will 
be removed. However14 
[a]s the New Zealand Government recognises New Zealand 's obligations under 
international law it is essential that such obligations be taken into account when 
executing removal orders. International obligations which may apply in such 
circumstances are: 
11 the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ... ; 
m the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child .. . 
This is an express recognition that international instruments are relevant to 
removal decisions. The two documents contain provisions on the rights of children 
that must be taken into account in executing a removal order. 15 
Further recognition of an assessment of rights is in D4.45.5a of the policy 
guidelines. The Immigration officer must "take into account the particulars of the 
case and the impact removal might have on the rights of: ... any immediate family 
associated with that person, (particularly those who are New Zealand citizens or 
residents)." This also incorporates the rights of the New Zealand citizen children 
into the decision making process. Those rights are not absolute and must be 
balanced against the rights of others. In particular, against 16 
the rights and interests of the state in determining who should reside 
within its borders ; 
11 the principal goals of the Government residence policy; 
111 the intention of the Immigration Act 1987 to ensure a high level of 
compliance with immigration laws; 
13 NZIS, above n 5, D2.10 and Immigration Act 1987 s 45 and 46. 
14 NZIS, above n 5, D4.45a. 
1
~ Pu!i 'uvea v Removal Review Authority (1996) 14 FRNZ 322, 334 (CA) [Puli 'uvea]. 
16 NZIS, above n 5, D4.45 .5b 
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1v the need to be fair to other potential immigrants who have not met 
policy requirements and who have not been able to remain in New Zealand. 
This balancing process indicates there has been "a change from asking whether 
government has the power to do something, to asking whether persons have a right 
that it not be done." 17 The rights of the individual are not unqualified, but they 
must at least be considered. Deficiencies in the procedure will attract criticism by 
the court. The application of this concept will be discussed later in Part V. 
III NEW ZEALAND DOMESTIC LEGISLATION 
A Immigration Act 1987 
The relevant law is contained firstly in the Immigration Act 1987 that empowered 
the ZIS to create the policy guidelines. Of particular importance to the children 
in these cases is Section 3(1), which provides that "every New Zealand citizen has, 
by virtue of that citizenship, the right to be in New Zealand at any time." Also 
Section 3(3) "no such citizen is liable under this Act to removal or deportation 
from New Zealand in any circumstances." 
When children leave New Zealand with their illegal immigrant parents Section 
3(3) has been breached because the children are in fact 'removed' from the 
country. But the courts have distinguished removal orders for the parent and the 
consequential choice to take their children with them. 18 It is correct to say that the 
children are not the subject matter of the removal order, but the end result is 
removing New Zealand citizens from New Zealand. The only difference is the 
label attached, "removal from New Zealand" and "leaving New Zealand". The 
same detriment results for the child, which is morally wrong. 
17 Carl E Schneider "Discretion and Rules: A Lawyers View" in Keith Hawkins (ed) The Uses of 
Discretion (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992) 52. 
9 
The children are in a sense removed because their parents have no real alternative 
but to take their children with them, yet the court in Elika v Minister of 
Immigration said Mrs Elika had a choice to leave her children in New Zealand. 19 
Mrs Elika could leave her children with their father, her defacto partner. For most 
illegal immigrants, with no other family in New Zealand there is no choice. 
The illegal immigrants are pushed into making a difficult decision that the State 
stands back from. The choice to abandon their child or maintain the family at a 
lesser standard of living. Although the decision is agonising it is primarily 
demanded by the immigrants' own circumstances. The State must uphold the 
immigration laws and so illegal immigrants should leave New Zealand. If this 
means taking their New Zealand citizen children with them, then that is the 
unfortunate result. 
Once a removal order has been executed, the persons have a right to appeal to the 
Removal Review Authority (RRA) within 42 days. The grounds of appeal are20 
exceptional circumstances of an humanitarian nature that would make it unjust 
or unduly harsh for the person to be removed from New Zealand, and that it 
would not in all the circumstances be contrary to the public interest to allow the 
person to remain in New Zealand. 
These grounds incorporate the interests of New Zealand born children into the 
appeal process. 
B Citizenship Act 1977 
The sta1iing point for those rights in the Immigration Act 1987 is that every person 
born in New Zealand "shall be a New Zealand citizen by birth."21 Therefore, 
18 Elika v Minister of immigration [1996] 1 NZLR 741, 749 (HC) [Elika]. 
19 Elika, above n 18, 749. 
20 Immigration Act 1987 s 47(3) and ZIS, above n 5, D4.75. 
21 Citizenship Act 1977 s 6(1). 
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regardless of the immigration status of parents, anyone born in New Zealand has 
the rights and privileges that attach to New Zealand citizenship. 
Section 6(1) is sensible in practice and is easy to apply. Nevertheless, it does 
intensify the situation with regard illegal immigrants, since the rights of ew 
Zealand citizens are relevant when executing removal orders. 22 When a child born 
in New Zealand to illegal immigrants is given New Zealand citizenship this is one 
more factor the State must balance when deciding to remove parents. This 
citizenship provides a convenient link to New Zealand for illegal immigrants who 
have no further rights to be in New Zealand, which is a problem with the rule. 
The birthright citizenship rule needs to be changed to reduce the number of 
immigration cases before the courts. However these changes may not be sensible 
in practice. The changes will be discussed in Part VI 
C New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
Section 18 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) is also 
relevant. Those lawfully in New Zealand have a right of residence in New 
Zealand. New Zealand citizen children are lawfully in New Zealand and have a 
right to remain as residents . Yet in most cases, they depart with their parents, 
which is in effect removal. 
This point was argued in Schier v Removal Review Authority.23 In that case the 
Court of Appeal agreed with the RRA, that as a consequence of the lawful removal 
of Mr and Mrs Schier they had "no practical option" but to take their three New 
Zealand born children with them. However this is not to be "characterised as the 
unlawful ' indirect' removal of the children by the New Zealand authorities ."24 
22 NZIS, above 11 5, D4.45.5a. 
23 Schier v Removal Review A ulhority [ I 999] I ZLR 703 , 706 (CA) [Schier]. 
24 Schier, above 11 23, 709 . 
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This statement supports the view that the children are not subject to the removal 
order and hence are not 'removed ' . 
The children's right to residence in New Zealand for the time being cannot be 
enjoyed, because they must leave New Zealand. This right has not been breached 
because of an act of state;25 the right cannot be enjoyed because the illegal 
immigrant parents have decided to keep the family together and leave New 
Zealand. Therefore the State is removed from the decision. The right of residence 
still exists and if a child returns to New Zealand they can still enjoy this right, the 
result is justified. 
In the end both Mr and Mrs Schier and their three children left New Zealand. They 
filed a complaint with the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights in 
1998, which was later withdrawn to advance the review by the Minister of 
Immigration. Lianne Dalziel is currently reviewing the case because the Schier's 
wish to return to New Zealand. 26 Therefore the media attention the case attracted 
has been beneficial to the plight of the Schiers. 
In sum, the New Zealand domestic legislation recogmses the children as New 
Zealand citizens and introduces their right to remain in New Zealand. 
IV INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
The NZIS policy guidelines specifically refer to the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) as being relevant to a decision to execute a removal 
25 For the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 to apply it must be an act of the State, New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 s 3. 
26
' Deported couple 's case likely for review" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 11 July 
2000, 2. 
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warrant. These international instruments provide specific protection for the rights 
of children. 
A United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 
The most prominent recognition of children's rights 1s m the CRC that ew 
Zealand ratified in 1993. 
This Convention expanded the protection given broadly to all by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR because it was considered that 
"childhood is entitled to special care and assistance."27 Because children are in a 
vulnerable position extra protection is justified. Therefore the CRC is tailored 
especially to the needs of children. 
The Convention offers protection and recogmses rights for children in a vast 
number of circumstances, including such things as abduction (Articles 11 and 35), 
cultural identity (Article 29(1)), health (Article 24(1)) and recreation (Article 
31(1)) to name but a few. The Convention "reflect[s] the generally accepted 
standards of society in this country". 28 The predominant views on how children 
should be treated are encapsulated in this document. In Minister for Immigration 
and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh the High Court of Australia had to decide on the 
appropriateness of the CRC to a decision to remove an immigrant convicted of a 
drug offence. Gaudron J thought the Convention gave expression to a fundamental 
right already recognised in society.29 There should be no dispute when applying 
the provisions in the CRC because society expects these standards to be 
recognised. The CRC collects the rights and protections and makes them more 
identifiable and accessible. 
27 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child preamble and Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights art 25(2). 
28 H v F (1993) 10 FRNZ 486,499 (HC). 
29 Minister/or immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh 128 ALR 353 , 376 (HCA) [Teoh]. 
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J Article 3(1) 
The relevant provision of the Convention for the purposes of the rights of children 
in immigration cases is Article 3(1). "In all actions concerning children, whether 
undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, 
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall 
be a primary consideration." 
During development of the Article there was discussion about the consideration 
requirement. The wording of the aiiicle was originally" ... shall be the paramount 
consideration."30 However this was thought by some Delegates to be too broad.31 
It was possible that "there were situations in which the competing interests, inter 
alia, of justice and society at large should be of at least equal if not, greater 
importance than the interests of the child."32 This is sensible, as a broad 
convention such as the CRC operates at many levels and an article that would 
make the interests of the child the 'paramount' consideration would create too 
much of a burden on the decision making body. If the interests of the child were 
the 'paramount' consideration then illegal immigrants would have a much better 
chance of remaining in New Zealand on this basis, which would not be acceptable. 
In fact restrictions or limitations on children's rights may be necessary and 
j usti fiab I e in some circumstances. 33 Immigration may be such a circumstance. 
2 Does Article 3(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child apply in the 
immigration context? 
Notwithstanding the recognition by the NZIS that the CRC is relevant to 
immigration decisions it is useful to examine whether it does actually have 
constructive application. 
30 Sharon Detrick (ed) The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Guide to the 
"Travaux Prepartoires" (Martinus Nijhoff, Netherlands, 1992 ) 131 . 
31 Detrick, above n 30, 133. 
32 Detrick, above n 30, 137. 
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Firstly, Article 3(1) applies "[i]n all actions concerning children". A decision to 
execute a removal order on a parent of a child qualifies as an action that concerns 
children, as they will be affected by the consequences. This matter was considered 
in Teoh. The Minister in that case relied on the definition of 'concerning' to mean 
"regarding and touching". 34 A decision to remove parents affects children, but 
does not touch them. 35 Mason CJ and Deane J disapproved of this argument and 
required a broad reading and application of the Convention. 36 Adopting the 
interpretation of the Minister would be to restrict the application of the CRC to 
only a few situations. This would not be a satisfactory result because the expected 
standards would not be applied. 
What also must be considered is that the Article refers to "the child". This means 
all children within the jurisdiction of the State.37 Regardless of the immigration 
status of parents, children must be protected, because children are vulnerable. New 
Zealand society would expect all children within the State to have the same rights 
and protections as a fundamental proposition. 
An obligation is imposed on the State to consider the best interests of the child in 
all decisions, regardless of resources available. In Article 4, economic, social and 
cultural rights are implemented within the available resources. Article 3(1) has 
wide application and must be applied in all relevant situations without dissent. The 
State party cannot rely on a lack of resources argument to justify not applying the 
Article. This treatment reinforces the importance of the Article's application. 
33 GW Austin "Children 's Rights in New Zealand Law and Society" (1995) 25 VUWLR 249, 281. 
34 JA Simpson and ESC Weiner (eds) Th e Oxford English Dictiona1y (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1989) 657. 
35 Teoh , above n 29, 363. 
36 Teoh , above n 29, 363. 
37 Mark Henaghan "The Legal Significance of the Ratification of the UN Convention of the Rights 
of the Child" (1993) 9 Children 11. 
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The Convention then applies in the immigration context, because the decision will 
be made by NZIS, which is an "administrative authorit[y ]". 38 The requirement is 
that in decisions to remove parents, the best interests of the child are a primary 
consideration. 
3 The best interests requirement 
The best interests requirement is difficult to follow. There is no guidance in the 
provision as to who decides the child's best interests or on what grounds they 
should be based. This concern was raised during development of the provision 
where the Delegate from Venezuela thought the provision was too subjective. 39 
This objection was later withdrawn. There is also no guidance as to what interests 
are relevant - physical, mental or spiritual. This could be overcome by requiring an 
examination of the overall interests in unison, which would give the greatest 
protection. These deficiencies in meaning were not resolved when the Convention 
was developed. It would appear the meaning was either taken for granted or 
considered unimportant. 40 
Robert Mnookin was one of the first authors to critique the principle. He 
formulated the principle as "equivalent to the least detrimental alternative". 41 The 
least detrimental alternative is consistent with what is in a child's best interests. 
However the same outcome would not result in all situations. For example, in the 
medical context, it could be in the person's best interests to receive chemotherapy 
treatment, but the least detrimental alternative would be a bone maITow transplant, 
because the side effects of chemotherapy are avoided. 
38 United ations Convention on the Rights of the Child art 3(1). 
39 Detrick, above n 30, I 3 7. 
40 Philip Alston "The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture and Hwnan 
Rights" in Philip Alston, Stephen Parker and John Seymour (eds) Children, Rights and the law 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992) 1, 11. 
41 Robert Mnookin "Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indete1minacy" 
(1975) 39(3) Law & Contemporary Problems 226, 255. 
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Mnookin 's fonnulation of least detrimental alternative therefore does not clarify 
the meaning of best interests. Mnookin also puts forward that best interests are not 
an action that "would pose an immediate and substantial threat to the child's 
physical health". 42 This is not comprehensive, as there is no reference to mental or 
spiritual interests, which should be considered. 
The problem that exists with best interests, particularly in immigration cases, is 
that in order to evaluate the best interests a value must be put on all possible 
outcomes. Those outcomes are matters of pure speculation. 43 In general the 
outcomes will be to stay in New Zealand with or without parents or to return to the 
parents' home country to a lesser standard of living which was argued in 
Puli 'uvea. 44 The consequences of these options will not be known for some time. 
What appears to be in the child ' s best interests now might not be in five years 
time. However this problem is a general flaw in the best interests requirement. The 
only solution is to obtain current and relevant information for the decision-maker. 
Then there would be a satisfactory base for the decision, so as to eliminate 
speculation. 
Linked to this speculation is the problem that the decision-maker decides the 
child's best interests. This "provides a convenient cloak for bias, paternalism and 
capricious decision making. "45 Everyone defines best interests differently; it 
depends on the value system of the decision-maker.46 The NZIS on behalf of the 
State is executing the removal order, the best interests of the child are to be 
weighed against the rights of the State to decide who can reside in New Zealand 
and enforce the immigration law. 47 
42 Mnookin, above n 41, 249. 
43 Stephen Parker "The Best Interests of the Child - Principles and Problems" in Philip Alston, 
Stephen Parker and John Seymour (eds) Children, Rights and th e Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1992) 26, 30. 
44 Puli 'uvea, above n 15 , 332 . 
45 Parker, above n 43, 26. 
46 Parker, above n 43 , 26. 
47 NZIS, above n 5, 04.45.5. 
17 
There is an inherent risk of bias because the decision-maker (NZIS) is effectively 
the same as one of the parties (the State). This is true of all government decisions 
but is particularly important in the immigration context because of the potential 
outcome of leaving New Zealand. But there is no suitable alternative party to 
decide these outcomes. They must be formulated by the NZIS who executes the 
removal orders. 
Given the deficiencies of the principle, its value is that it injects issues into the 
decision making process.48 The decision-maker must consider the position of the 
child by weighing up the potential outcomes and assigning a value to them. There 
is at least an examination of the effect of an action on the child. Therefore the best 
interests requirement is the better option to recognise and protect children's 
interests because the effect of the outcome on the child is considered. 
4 Application of Article 3(1) in the immigration context 
Article 3(1) stipulates that the "best interests of the child shall be a pnmary 
consideration." The interests of the child are not absolute. What is required is a 
genuine consideration, something more than a token or merely fonnal examination 
to ensure all aspects are factored into the decision.49 This requirement imposes a 
workable obligation on the decision-maker and would be the minimum standard 
possible. 
In Puli 'uvea 50 the Court thought the starting point was the person unlawfully in 
New Zealand, the parents. This would make it extremely difficult for the 
children's interests to outweigh a breach of the Immigration Act 1987. But the law 
must be upheld and this does occur at the expense of innocent third parties. 
48 John Eekelaar "The Interests of the Child and the Child 's Wishes: the Role of Dynamic Self-
Determination" in Philip Alston, Stephen Parker and John Seymour (eds) Children, Rights and the 
Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992) 42, 46. 
49 Alston, above n 40, 13. 
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The Minister in Teoh also argued this stance. 51 Mr Teoh's criminal convictions 
were thought by the Immigration officer to outweigh any claims of compassion by 
the children or Mrs Teoh. The Immigration officer recognised the bleak future for 
the family, and that Mr Teoh was the only person who could keep the family 
together because of his wife's heroin addiction. But the Immigration officer 
thought the family circumstances were subordinate to Mr Teoh's unlawful actions. 
Mason CJ and Deane J criticised the argument. They took a human rights approach 
to maximise the rights of children. Mason CJ and Deane J indicated that the rights 
of the children must be established first, which ensures absolute protection for 
children, which is a desirable achievement. 
The starting point is to establish the interests of the child and weigh those against 
any other interests, such as the State's. What is required is a balancing exercise. 52 
However there is no indication of the weight to be placed on each factor. The 
weighting is left to the decision-maker and is not reviewable by the court. 53 Whilst 
this recognises that different views attach to different factors and is best left to 
discretion, it introduces issues of inconsistency. The balancing exercise is going to 
favour the State in upholding immigration law. Therefore the process really does 
not give adequate protection to children, as their cause is predominately inferior to 
the State's. 
Tavita presents an exception to the norm because it was the first in this line of 
cases. The rights of the child had not been considered in the situation, because the 
child had not been born when Mr Tavita's removal was ordered. Cooke P 
indicated that "the basic rights of the family and the child are the starting point."54 
The fact that Mr Tavita was the sole caregiver for the child was important. In an 
affidavit by Dr AA Kerr, pediatrician, it was stated that if Mr Ta vita was to leave 
New Zealand the care for the child would no longer be available which would 
50 Puli 'uvea, above n 15, 329. 
51 Teoh, above n 29, 366 per Mason CJ and Deane J. 
52 Elika, above n 18, 746. 
53 Pidi 'uvea, above n 15, 334. 
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affect the child's well-being and development, which would not be in her best 
interests. 55 
The distinguishing feature in Tavita was that the NZIS had never referred to the 
CRC or the ICCPR because the child had not been born when the removal was 
ordered. The Crown acknowledged that the case had not been considered from this 
point of view, and may produce a different result. 56 The Court allowed the 
Minister time to reconsider the circumstances.57 Mr Tavita was then given 
permission to remain in New Zealand. 58 The criticism of the treatment is quite 
harsh, given that the rights of the child cannot be important unless the child has 
been born. But once a child is born, it is essential that those rights are the starting 
point, as the Court of Appeal in Tavita concluded. 59 The findings then prompted 
the NZIS to develop the considerations of international instruments in the policy 
guidelines. Since this case the courts have been swift to refuse any hope for 
residency on the basis of New Zealand citizen children. 
In Elika the Court recognised the stress the three New Zealand born children were 
likely to suffer if they had to leave New Zealand. There were no other family 
members in Tonga, no social welfare benefits and a lesser standard of education. 60 
Yet the Court still ordered removal of Mrs Elika who had been in New Zealand 
illegally for l O years. This approach reflects the position of NZIS on immigration. 
Even though the children's interests were considered they did not outweigh the 
fact that Mrs Elika was in New Zealand illegally. The result is unfair to the 
children, but in the end the law must be upheld. 
In Adi 'uvea, the Court acknowledged that the Puli 'uveas came to New Zealand as 
visitors, so they must have known they could not stay in New Zealand 
54 Tavita , above n 3, 266. 
55Tavita , above n 3, 260. 
56 Tavita , above n 3, 265. 
57 Tavita , above n 3, 266. 
58 Philip A Joseph "Constitutional Law" [1997] Z Law Rev 209, 228 ["Constitutional Law"]. 
59 Tavita , above n 3, 265. 
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indefinitely. 61 The relevant factors were that the children would miss their parents 
if they remained in New Zealand and that Mr Puli'uvea had no land or job in 
Tonga.62 In the Puli'uveas' case, life in New Zealand was not that ideal either, the 
Puli'uveas depended on charity from family members and lived in crowded 
conditions. Thus, remaining in New Zealand was not in the children's best 
interests anyway. The correct legal result ensued with the parents choosing to take 
their children with them when the removal order was eventually executed. In a 
sense the children's best interests were promoted by keeping the family together. 
Article 3(1) of the CRC does have important application in the immigration 
setting; the rights of the child are a "primary consideration." Children do not 
guarantee an illegal immigrant's right to stay in New Zealand, they are one 
consideration in the decision to remove their parents. 63 The balance that has been 
developed is to favour the rights of the State to uphold the immigration law, which 
is a good result. 
5 Article 9 
Another important provision for the immigration setting is Article 9. This provides 
that "[ s ]tate parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her 
parents against their will". On its face a decision to remove parents from New 
Zealand would be separating parents and child. The parents are removed from 
ew Zealand and their children can remain because they are New Zealand 
citizens. However the response from the courts is that the parents are being 
removed, not the children. The parents then have the choice to take their children 
with them when they leave New Zealand. If the parents decided to leave their 
children in New Zealand, there would be separation. This separation would not be 
from the action of the State, but from the action of the parents and so Article 9 no 
60 E!ika, above n 18, 747. 
6 1 Puli 'uvea, above n 15, 325. 
62 Puli'uvea, above n 15,333. 
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longer applies. This is a fine distinction and quite illogical. The problem with the 
logic is that the State has forced the separation of parents and child. But the 
distinguishing characteristic is that the separation is also forced by the 
circumstances of the parents; they are illegal immigrants and have no right to stay 
in New Zealand. Therefore if they choose to leave their children in New Zealand it 
is a consequence of their unlawful position. This is the justification for the current 
position; no criticism can be attributed to the State. 
B The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
The ICCPR is another international instrument that offers rights protection. It 
differs from the CRC, in that the protection is for all humans. The Covenant 
recognises that the rights devise from "the inherent dignity of the human person". 64 
Yet the ICCPR does offer specific protection to children. 
1 Article 23 
The ICCPR gives protection to the family and hence children. Article 23(1) 
provides that "[t]he family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society 
and is entitled to protection by society and the State." The State must seek to keep 
the family together. 
2 Does Article 23 apply in the immigration context? 
Article 23 gives protection to the family and is important in the immigration 
context. In decisions to remove illegal immigrant parents from a country, the 
family can be broken up. This would not be giving the family any protection. 
However, the courts do not equate removal of parents with removal of children. 
63 Richard Peter McLeod The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: implications 
for Domestic law (LLM Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 1995) 16. 
64 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights preamble. 
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Parents must decide whether to take their children with them, though sometimes 
because of their circumstances there is no real choice. 65 
The parents have a choice; they can leave their children in New Zealand, thus 
breaking up the family ; or take them with them when they leave New Zealand, 
keeping the family unit intact. In these situations the State is protecting the family 
because the parents decide the outcome. The fact that this choice is forced, by their 
own circumstances as illegal immigrants, must be realised. The choice is not 
driven by the State in enforcing the law. 
In Elika , the Immigration officials recorded the circumstances of the family and 
indicated that Mrs Elika would be best travelling with her three children to Tonga. 
Mrs Elika could also leave her children in New Zealand with her defacto partner, 
the children's father. 66 This highlights the options available to an illegal immigrant 
who has a partner legally in New Zealand. 
In Puli 'uvea, both parents were in New Zealand illegally. Their only option was to 
take their children with them or leave the children with an already large extended 
family. If both parents are illegal immigrants there may be no feasible option but 
to take their children out of New Zealand. It is basically a decision for the parents 
once the State has made the order for removal. Therefore although children leave 
New Zealand the family unit is maintained and there is no reviewable action under 
Article 23, which is correct. 
Mr and Mrs Puli'uvea wanted to remain in New Zealand on the basis of their three 
New Zealand born children's citizenship. However they had left a Tongan-born 
child in Tonga before coming to New Zealand. Therefore the Court was reluctant 
to accept the arguments advanced for the Puli'uveas concerning family unity.67 
When the family left New Zealand, family unity would be enhanced, as the whole 
65 As in Elika, above 11 18, 748 and Schier, above 11 23, 709. 
66 Elika , above 11 18, 747. 
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immediate family would be together in Tonga. Therefore the result is justified, 
even though the New Zealand born children must leave New Zealand. 
There has been a recent case 111 the media, which seems to typify the current 
situation where families are split up. Malama Soapi was removed from New 
Zealand. She chose not to take her three-month-old baby with her when she left for 
Tuvalu. The result was a tearful good bye at Auckland Airport. 68 In this case the 
young mother thought the child's future would be best served remaining in New 
Zealand with other family members. The decision to leave the child in New 
Zealand means that Ms Soapi cannot see her child in New Zealand for the five 
years that the removal order remains in place. It is harsh that the child cannot see 
her mother, but weighed against a life in New Zealand the best result for the child 
was to remain in New Zealand. 
3 Article 24 
Article 24(1) gives specific protection to children and states: 
[ e ]very child shall have without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such 
measures of protection as are required by his status as minor, on the part of his 
famil y, society and the State. 
This Article imposes a positive obligation, as does the CRC. This obligation falls 
on the family, society and also the State to protect children because of their 
vulnerable position in society. During the development of the Article, there was 
debate whether children needed this extra protection because all of the other 
protections and rights applied to children. 69 Delegates thought that some of the 
other rights in the ICCPR could not be fully exercised by children and a special 
67 Puli 'uvea, above n 15 , 334. 
68 "Overstayer law crnel for children" Nelson Mail, Nelson, New Zealand, 13 June 1999, 7. 
69 MJ Bossuyt Guide to the "'Travaux Preparatoires " of the international Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Netherlands, 1989) 455. 
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protection clause was justified.7° Children should be given this special protection 
because their characteristics are different to other persons, children lack capacity 
to make decisions so they should have protection which ensures their interests are 
considered. 
Article 24(3) states " [e]very child has the right to acquire a nationality." This is 
particularly relevant in the immigration context, because children who are New 
Zealand citizens leave New Zealand when illegal immigrant parents are removed. 
Removal from a country of birth may affect nationality, because nationality is 
affected by country of residence. 
4 Does Article 24 apply in the immigration context? 
Article 24 protects "[ e ]very child". This means any child within the territory of the 
State.71 Regardless of the immigration status of their parents, all children are 
entitled to protection. 
The level of protection required is not stated, nor is there any guidance as to what 
must be protected. In the immigration context what must be protected is the right 
of the child to stay in New Zealand as a New Zealand citizen and to remain with 
their family. The State must firstly decide the level of protection. The State makes 
the decision whether to enforce the removal order against illegal immigrants. The 
parents must then protect their children either by taking the children with them 
when they leave New Zealand and keeping the family together or leaving them in 
New Zealand and preserving their future. This would be the level of protection 
decided by the family . Society also has a role of protection if children remain in 
New Zealand . Society bears the cost of education, health and other benefits to 
children. 
70 Bossuyt, above n 55, 456. 
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The approach to protection would be similar to that required under Article 3(1) of 
the CRC. The interests of the children are relevant, but are generally subordinate 
to the rights of the State. There must be a consideration of the wider interests of 
the family and child, not mere incidental references. 72 To satisfy Article 24 the 
child's interests must be considered in a decision because they cannot voice them 
on their own. 
The right of the child to obtain a nationality under Article 24(3) is particularly 
difficult. The children have New Zealand citizenship, which entitles residence in 
New Zealand. However citizenship is different to nationality. 
Citizenship entitles "the citizen to all the rights, and binding the citizen to all of 
the duties of members of the body politic."73 By virtue of citizenship there is a 
right to vote and a right to free education. There is also an obligation to comply 
with New Zealand's tax obligations and obey and protect the laws of New 
Zealand. 74 Citizenship creates a connection between the individual and the State 
by imposing rights and obligations. 
This can be contrasted with nationality, which is a "connection between an 
individual and a state that results in, for example, diplomatic protection."75 
Nationality is an international law concept, conveying a sense of belonging to a 
state. Nationality creates a different type of connection between the individual and 
the State than citizenship. It creates a national unity because of an allegiance and 
patriotism between the individual and the State. In this regard, one could be a 
national of a country but not a citizen. For example a national of the United States 
would include persons from American Samoa. They are not citizens of the United 
States but owe a permanent allegiance to the United States because of the 
71 Melissa A Poole "International Instruments in Administrntive Decisions : Mainstreaming 
International Law" (1999) 30 VUWLR 91 , 97. 
72 Rajan v Minister of Immigration [ I 996) 3 NZLR 543, 550 (CA) [Rajan]. 
73 John W Guendelsberger "Access to Citizenship for Children Born Within the State to Foreign 
Parents" [1992) AM J Comp L 379, 382. 
74 Frequently Asked Questions <http//:www.citizenship.govt.nz>last updated 16 August 2000. 
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country's attachment to the United States. Therefore the country of residence 
would dictate nationality. Nationality is different to citizenship. 
Under Article 24(3) children have a right to acquire a nationality. Citizenship is 
granted by the Citizenship Act 1977 upon birth in New Zealand. The fact that 
children are removed from New Zealand with their illegal immigrant parents does 
not negate this. There is still a right to acquire a nationality, although in a foreign 
country. For example, moving to Tonga means the child will acquire a Tongan 
nationality. Nationality is something people can be identified by and reflects on 
their personalities. It is developed by belonging to and identifying with a nation. 
This right has not been broken if children leave New Zealand with their parents. 
Nationality is developed from the surroundings the child grows up in, this could be 
either New Zealand or a foreign country. 
Therefore the ICCPR is relevant in the context of immigration. The child and the 
family both require protection, the level of protection will be decided by the 
decision-maker. 
C The Role of International Instruments 
The ICCPR and the CRC contain articles that are relevant in the immigration 
context. There is debate over how these instruments should be applied by the NZIS 
and in tum the courts. The interpretation will affect the recognition and application 
of the rights of the New Zealand citizen children. 
It is common ground that it is the Legislature that makes the law for the country, 
Parliament developing law as elected representatives. However the Executive 
ratifies international instruments, which is where the problem occurs. If the 
international instruments are ratified but not specifically provided for in legislation 
they are not an act of the Legislature - the law making body. There is a fear that 
75 Guendelsberger, above n 73 , 328. 
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the Judiciary in applying the treaties would be "incorporating the [treaty] into ... 
domestic law through the back door". 76 This would not be an act of the Legislature 
enacting law, but the Judiciary making law, the Legislative power to make law 
would thus be undennined. However ratification is an act of the State and so 
sovereignty is still maintained. It is premature to criticise the ratification and 
application of unincorporated treaties as they are still an act of state. 
Cooke P in Tavita preferred a much more liberal approach. "A failure to give 
practical effect to international instrnments to which New Zealand is a party may 
attract criticism. Legitimate criticism could extend to the New Zealand Courts".77 
If the New Zealand courts failed to apply an international text by reason that is was 
not incorporated into domestic law, they could be criticised by international bodies 
such as the United Nations and the European Court of Human Rights. This is 
because some international norn1s are so fundamentally important that treaties 
must be given effect. Individuals would expect basic values to be adhered to in a 
decision by a state party otherwise ratification of a treaty is redundant. 
The point that treaties represent international norms was recognised in Teoh when 
Gaudron J indicated that the CRC represented values that were already inherent in 
Australian society. 78 The same analysis applies to New Zealand. 79 Therefore a 
failure to give effect to these standards either by a decision-maker or the courts 
would not be enforcing what society expects. If treaties are not applied the 
treatment should be criticised. 
76 R v Home Secretary, ex parte Brind [ I 991] AC 696, 761 (HC). 
77 Tavita , above n 3, 266. 
78 Teoh, above n 29, 376. 
79 H v F, above n 28, 499. 
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1 Do international instruments create mandatory relevant considerations in 
the immigration context? 
Following Tavita international instruments may be a mandatory relevant 
consideration. 80 This means that some international obligations are so important 
that no reasonable decision-maker can ignore them. Cooke P extended the 
prevailing view of the time which was developed in Ashby v Minister of 
Immigration. 81 An unincorporated treaty was only an aid to interpretation if there 
was some ambiguity with the operation of the Act, the treaty could not override the 
words of the Act. The Act still governs a decision but should be applied in 
consultation with the international treaties. This ensures an acceptable approach to 
protect fundamental human rights . 
Following the conunents in Tavita concerning the approach to the execution of 
removal orders, the NZIS revised the policy guidelines. These guidelines make 
specific reference to the international instruments. The obligation is for the NZIS 
to take such obligations into account when deciding to execute a removal order. 82 
This recognition makes the ICCPR and CRC mandatory relevant considerations. 83 
Even the mandatory relevant consideration stance has attracted criticism. It has 
been thought that for an international instrument to be a mandatory relevant 
consideration there must be "some statutory reference to the relevant obligation."84 
A statutory reference means that Parliament has identified which international 
texts are relevant so that the Legislature has involvement in the treaty process. But 
given the lengthy process of legislation this procedure would be slow and 
burdensome. Requiring statutory reference for every treaty for every state agency 
would create too much of a backlog on legislation through Parliament. The NZIS 
policy guidelines do not have the force of law, but represent the internal procedure 
80 Poole, above n 70, 91. 
81 Ashby v Minister of immigration [1981] 1 NZLR 222, 224 (HC) [A shby ]. 
82 NZIS, above n 5, D4.45a. 
83 Poole, above n 70, 95 . 
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to be followed when applying the Immigration Act 1987. It would be ridiculous if 
an express recognition that the ICCPR and CRC must be taken into account by the 
body that developed the guidelines, would not be a mandatory relevant 
consideration. 
This criticism can be reconciled to the Ashby general view by recognising that not 
all international instruments are mandatory considerations, they must of course be 
relevant and must impose an obligation that has arguably been breached or will be 
breached by the outcome under challenge. 85 This idea 1s emphasised in the 
identification by the NZIS of the ICCPR and CRC as being relevant to 
immigration decisions. 86 Since the NZIS has highlighted the importance of the 
ICCPR and the CRC it can be assumed that these are relevant considerations and 
must be examined. The fact the policy guidelines are not an Act of Parliament is 
irrelevant, because the NZIS is applying the Immigration Act 1987. 
In Elika the NZIS satisfied the requirement by balancing the rights in the ICCPR 
and the CRC against the "country's right to determine who may remain"87 in New 
Zealand. This approach ensures that the rights of the New Zealand citizen children 
have been accounted for in the process, giving the best possible protection within 
the Immigration Act 1987. 
In Puli 'uvea, the court found that the NZIS had considered the relevant 
instruments and so there was no reviewable error. 88 What the court will not stray 
into is suggesting the weight to be placed on each factor. It was recognised that 
"different views will be held about the balance to be struck between the various 
considerations."89 The weights of different factors are not reviewable. The 
decision-maker (NZIS) is in the best position to decide the weightings. The fact 
84 GDS Taylor "Administrative Law" [1997] NZ Law Rev 187, 204. 
85 Rodney Harrison "Domestic Enforcement of International Human Rights in Courts of Law: 
Some Recent Developments" [1995] NZLJ 256, 263 . 
86 NZIS, above n 5, D4.45. 
87 Elika, above n 18, 748. 
88 Pu/i'uvea, above n 15 , 334. 
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that the NZIS is a state agency means that the rights of the State are going to be 
predominant, but is a consequence of the immigration system. 
There is still dissent concerning international instruments as mandatory relevant 
considerations. The first argument hypothesises that the Executive enters into 
treaties so they cannot be mandatory relevant considerations. There is the basic 
fear that this would result in unincorporated treaties being incorporated into 
domestic law without the vote of Parliament. This would be changing the law, 
without the consent of Parliament, which in tum violates the separation of powers 
and the concept of Parliamentary sovereignty. 
However mandatory relevant considerations do not have to alter the law; they just 
form one of the factors that must be considered in a decision. 9° For example the 
State ' s right to determine who resides in New Zealand under the Immigration Act 
1987 must be factored alongside the "best interests of the child". 91 Under this 
interpretation the fact that illegal immigrants have New Zealand born children 
does not impose an obligation on the State to grant residence on the basis of the 
ICCPR or the CRC. The obligation is to consider the rights of the children when 
deciding to remove the parents. 
This proposition imports the rights established by the international obligations into 
the decision process. It does not make the international instruments New Zealand 
law. It simply allows persons within the State's jurisdiction to rely on the 
provisions in the immigration context. This effectively recognises that there are 
other factors relevant to the exercise of a discretion that Parliament has not 
considered or failed to consider. 92 Which would make the decision more informed 
and better for the individual and the State. 
89 Pu!i 'uvea, above n 15 , 334. 
90 "Constitutional Law", above n 58, 229. 
9 1 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art 3(1). 
92 "Constitutional Law", above n 58, 229. 
31 
In Rajan the Court canvassed the arguments concerning whether the discretion of 
the Minister was to be subject to the international instruments. The issue whether 
the international instruments were a mandatory relevant consideration and was not 
finally decided. 93 
The arguments for reading the discretion as subject to the international instruments 
are that they could be read consistently with the Section.94 Section 20(1) confers 
discretion on the Minister; therefore the international instruments can be read into 
this discretion. In this sense the law is not changed and so there would be no fear 
of back door importation of a treaty. The right in question, to remain as a resident 
in New Zealand is important to immigrants. Therefore the rights in the 
international instruments, as being indicative of society's expectations and 
humanitarian views, would be relevant and should be considered. There is also the 
right to appeal on humanitarian grounds, so the rights in the international 
instruments would also be relevant when initially making the decision. 
Arguments against reading international instruments as a mandatory relevant 
consideration are that the discretion of the Minister is simply a discretion not a 
power, therefore this should not carry any mandatory considerations. However 
since it is a discretion there needs to be some check on the power. The decisions 
must be consistent and so imposing mandatory relevant considerations would 
ensure there is no criticism. The obligations on behalf of the Minister are not 
onerous, only to take the international instruments into account. Therefore the fact 
they are mandatory is not problematic. Also argued was that Section 20(1) is not 
explicit as regards humanitarian considerations. 95 However reading in the 
humanitarian considerations provided in the ICCPR and CRC would not create 
major difficulties, but would aid the decision making. The last argument was that 
the examination of the international instruments falls to the Deportation Review 
93 Rajan , above n 72 , 551 . 
94 That is the Immigration Act 1987 s 20(1) "The Minister may at any time revoke a permit .. . " 
95 As compared to Immigration Act 1987 s 63B, s 105 and s 22 (as they were in 1996). 
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Tribunal. If the case is then referred to the Tribunal the issues will have already 
been canvassed making the decision easier to review. 
The first argument can be displaced, labeling an international instrument as a 
mandatory relevant consideration does not change the law, it injects issues into the 
decision making process. 
A further argument against international instruments being a mandatory relevant 
consideration is practicality. The instruments are the product of a multi-state 
agreement and are the consensus of many different views. 96 The texts are 
developed by diverse member states for use in their own territories. Therefore the 
fact they represent the agreement of many nations should indicate their 
importance. As has been mentioned, Gaudron J in Teoh thought the CRC 
represents what society expects. 97 In this sense the international texts are relevant 
from the general viewpoint of society. Therefore international texts should be 
mandatory relevant considerations, because society expects the principles to be 
adhered to. 
The thrust of the argument is that the international texts will be difficult to apply 
because of the way they have been developed. This does not indicate they are not 
relevant. It simply indicates that there should be caution in application. The 
decision-maker has the discretion to decide what factors are important, but must at 
least examine the international instrument to ensure protection is given to the 
relevant parties. 
The approach of the NZIS in applying the international instruments has been that 
the rights contained are not absolute, but must be balanced against other rights, 
96 "Constitutional Law", above 11 58, 230. 
97 Teoh, above 11 29, 376. 
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such as the rights of the State. 98 Therefore the ICCPR and CRC create mandatory 
relevant considerations in the immigration context. 
2 Do international instruments create a legitimate expectation m the 
immigration context? 
There is another interpretation of international instruments created by the majority 
of the Court in Teoh. Gaudron J thought that in the context of the CRC, there was 
an expectation that it would be given effect because it encapsulated human rights 
already inherent in Australian society. 99 Children could rely on the argument that 
the decision-maker would consider their best interest as a primary consideration, 
because society expected it. This argument is plausible. 
The Court disagreed on the formulation and application of the legitimate 
expectation. But the Court did dismiss the Minister's appeal and allowed Mr Teoh 
to remain in Australia. 
Mason CJ and Deane J thought there was a legitimate expectation the CRC would 
be followed. This did not require a set procedure as that would be back door 
importation of a treaty. They indicated that procedural fairness would require 
notice to be given if a decision was to be taken inconsistently with the 
Convention. 100 Giving notice is quite fair. If there is an expectation that a decision 
will be made with consideration of an international obligation and it is not going to 
be decided that way, they should be infonned. However the problem exists that 
why should an unincorporated treaty have to be considered in a domestic decision? 
It falls back on Gaudron J's reasoning that the Convention represents ideas already 
inherent in society. 101 Therefore even though the texts are not recognised in law 
98 NZIS, above n 5, D4.45 . 
99 Teoh , above n 29, 376. 
100 Teoh , above n 29, 365. Gaudron J also agreed with on this point at 376. 
10 1 Teoh, above n 29, 376. 
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they are what society expects. If they are not examined, criticism could result 
because a poor decision will be made. 102 
Toohey J also formulated the legitimate expectation along the same lines. He said 
that if the decision-maker was not going to treat the best interests as a primary 
consideration, then an opportunity must be given to argue that it should. 103 Toohey 
J then said there is no obligation to make inquiries, but doing so will put the 
decision-maker in a better position to meet the expectation. 104 Toohey J's 
formulation imposes an obligation to inform an affected party of how a decision 
will be made, which is reasonable. The affected party can then introduce further 
ev idence. The obligation does not force the decision-maker to decide in favour of 
the affected party, as that would be a fetter on the decision-maker's power, which 
would be a ridiculous result. 
McHugh J dissented on the legitimate expectation issue and thought no such 
expectation existed. McHugh J indicated that an expectation could only exist if the 
affected person knew about the Convention and there was an express or implied 
undertaking to that person. 105 This seems plausible; you cannot expect something 
to be followed when you do not know of its existence. However your expectation 
could stem from a belief as a member of society. 
It is uncertain whether this legitimate expectation would be applied in New 
Zealand. The NZIS guidelines expressly recognise of the relevance of the 
international instruments . McHugh J said that unless a decision-maker has given 
some indication that provisions of a convention will be applied, it is not reasonable 
to expect the convention to apply to the decision.
106 Since the NZIS has stated in 
the policy guidelines that the ICCPR and CRC are relevant, there is a legitimate 
expectation that these would be considered. Under Mason CJ and Deane J' s 
102 As was thought in Tavita, above n 4, 266. 
103 Teoh, above n 29, 373. 
104 Teoh, above n 29, 374. 
105 Teoh, above n 29,38 1. 
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approach NZIS would be required to notify an illegal immigrant if a decision is not 
going to be taken in accordance with the ICCPR or CRC. This would not be 
onerous. Under Toohey I's approach an illegal immigrant would then be given the 
opportunity to present evidence that a decision should be taken in accordance with 
the ICCPR and CRC, this ensures all evidence is available which is easily 
attainable. 
Therefore the ICCPR and CRC create a legitimate expectation in the immigration 
context. 
The Australian Senate has expressed disapproval of the decision in Teoh . The 
Administrative Decisions (Effect of International Instruments) Bill 1999 is 
currently before the House of Representatives. The Bill seeks to "set aside 
legitimate expectations arising out of entry into treaties." 107 The reason this Bill 
was introduced was because it was thought that Teoh was inconsistent with the 
proper function of Parliament incorporating treaties into Australian law. 108 This is 
the same fear that was presented against international treaties being mandatory 
relevant considerations, that the law will be changed by a body other than 
Parliament. However the law is not changed if an international treaty 1s a 
mandatory relevant consideration or a legitimate expectation. All that is required is 
that the decision-maker informs the affected person and an opportunity to advance 
further arguments is permitted . 
There was also a fear that this expectation would be unworkable in practice as 
Australia is party to many thousand treaties. However "[a]dministrators exercise 
discretion functions within a known and ascertainable compass and may readily 
access relevant international obligations." 109 Not all treaties would be relevant to 
all agencies . The NZIS has identified that the ICCPR, the CRC, the Convention 
106 Teoh , above n 29, 383. 
107 (13 October 1999) House of Representatives Official Hansard, 11436. 
108 Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Attorney General Statement 1997. 
36 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the Convention Against Torture are relevant 
to their activities. 11 0 The argument is fundamentally flawed because what is the 
point of ratification of a convention if there is no expectation it would be 
followed? There is a conflicting message to society. 
In South Australia the equivalent Bill has been passed at State level. Section 3(2) 
of the Administrative Decisions (Effect oflntemational Instruments) Act 1995 sets 
aside the legitimate expectation that a decision will conform to the instrument or 
that a case can be presented against a decision which was not in terms of a 
convention. This overriding of the legitimate expectation principle is unwarranted, 
it is a "blunt repudiation of ... international obligations and, without much doubt, 
a serious breach of international law." 111 This legislation reduces the significance 
of international instruments which is unfounded because a legitimate expectation 
does not change the law. 
In short, it must be recognised that children can argue mandatory relevant 
considerations or legitimate expectations of international instruments against the 
State. 
3 What does this mean in the immigration context? 
In an immigration case an argument could be made that the ICCPR and the CRC 
create either mandatory relevant considerations or a legitimate expectation. 112 
To satisfy the mandatory relevant consideration requirement the NZIS must at 
least have regard to the documents that represent the rights of the children in 
109 Philip A Joseph "Constitutional Review Now" [1998] Z Law Rev 85, 116 ["Constitutional 
Review Now"] . 
1 
'
0 NZIS, above n 5, D4.45. 
111 Jianfu Chen "Taking International Obligations More Seriously" in Cross Currents: 
Internationalism, National Identity and Law (Australasian Law Teachers Association, Bundoora, 
1995) 181 , 185. 
11 2 Hanison, above n 85 , 263. 
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making decisions. 11 3 The balance for each factor is still left to the NZIS and the 
court will not decide on the balance for each factor. The nature of the obligation; 
the relevance of the international instrument; the discretion involved and the 
subject matter of the legislation would probably determine the balance. 114 Since 
remaining in New Zealand is fundamental and is directly related to New Zealand 
citizen children, it is arguable that the provisions of the international instruments 
would form the basis of the decision. However as the issue concerns immigration 
and the State has the right to choose who remains in the territory the State will 
prevail. 
The reasoning in Teoh can be transferred to New Zealand. This would mean on the 
majority approach that an illegal immigrant could expect that a decision would be 
made in accordance with the ICCPR and the CRC. If this was not going to be done 
then the immigrant would have to be notified. The approach would mean the rights 
of the children must be considered and their best interests followed. 
The international instruments provide the introduction of the rights of New 
Zealand born children in immigration cases. It is useful to formulate what these 
rights are. 
V THE RIGHTS HOLDERS 
In all situations various groups have different rights and these rights inevitably 
conflict. This Part will look at the rights of the New Zealand citizen children, but 
will also examine the balance with the rights of the State, the rights of New 
Zealanders as members of society and the rights of parents. 
113 Tavita , above n 3, 266. 
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A Children as Rights Holders 
The general view is that rights holders are those people that have the capacity and 
competency to choose between their own actions. This proposition is identified by 
Hart when he states "a right is a normative capacity that the bearer may choose to 
use for the furtherance of his or her own interests or projects, a sanctioned exercise 
of legitimate control over others." 115 This suggests that rights can only be held by 
persons who can choose to act for their own interests against others. This would 
then exclude children and others who lack capacity to make decisions, such as 
intellectually handicapped persons and mental health patients, which is 
abhorrent. 116 
It is obvious that such vulnerable groups would be the sorts of classes of people 
that should have strict rights because, by virtue of their position, they are more 
susceptible to abuse. 11 7 Thus exposed groups require protection from not only the 
State, but also other rights holders. The rights of children arise from the interest of 
" . d . fr h ,,11 8 care, secunty an protection om arm. 
Protection is important to the concept of rights for children. If it was accepted that 
children themselves could not be rights holders, at least personal representatives 
could hold the rights and enforce or waive them as they see best. 11 9 The personal 
representative would act as a proxy rights holder in deciding a course of action for 
a child, or the person who lacks the requisite capacity. This commonly occurs now 
114 Andrew and Petra Butler "The Judicial Use of International Human Rights Law in New 
Zealand" (1999) 29 VUWLR 173, 182. 
115 HLA Hart Essays on Bentham Jurisprudence and Political Theory (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1982) 173 . 
11 6 Indeed the rights are encapsulated in the Guardianship Act 1968, the Protection of Personal and 
Property Rights Act 1988 and the Mental Health Act I 992 respectively. 
11 7 This point was acknowledged by Tom D Campbell "The Rights of the Minor: as Person, as 
Child, as Juvenile, as Future Adult" in Philip Alston, Stephen Parker and John Seymour (eds) 
Children, Rights and the Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992) 2, 11. 
118 Campbell, above n 117, 21 . 
11 9 Robert Young "In the Interests of Children and Adolescents" in William Aiken and Hugh La 
Follette Whose Child? Children 's Rights, Parental Authority and State Power (Rowman and 
Littlefield, Totowa, ew Jersey, 1980) 187. 
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m the case of children in legal proceedings and in contracts. Intellectually 
handicapped persons have welfare guardians appointed by the court to decide 
medical treatment. 
Although this position does acknowledge that children do have interests that 
require protection, it is not very satisfactory. The recognition of the rights depends 
upon another person invoking those rights on the child's behalf. Therefore that 
personal representative would determine the child's interests. It should be 
understood that children have different interests to their parents (who are most 
commonly the personal representative) and procedures must be taken to ensure 
these interests are not overridden 120 and are recognised. 
Children should be able to hold rights because "the child is a person and not 
merely an object of concem." 121 Children have fundamental freedoms that must be 
protected. Therefore children along with all the other members of society can hold 
all of the rights in the NZBORA. However they cannot be enforced, or invoked on 
their own behalf until the child reaches an age of competency and understanding. 
This is what Hart was meaning with his definition of a rights holder. The rights of 
Life and Security of the Person would apply from birth, but could not be enforced 
by the child on their own. Also some of the Democratic and Civil Rights would 
not apply to children, such as the right to vote. Other rights such as freedom of 
movement would apply to children but would need to be enforced by another 
person. 
Therefore to promote recognition of children's own interests and thoughts it must 
be conceived that children can possess rights, have independent interests and have 
the competence to evaluate these interests. 122 In family migration decisions it is 
suggested that children should be given a view, and indeed a right to be heard and 
considered in a decision to shift a family base from the United Kingdom to a new 
120 Young,aboven 119, 184. 
121 Report of the Inquiry into Child Abuse in Cleveland (1987) Cm 412, 245 . 
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country. 123 Eekelaar believes that a child's view should influence a decision if it is 
compatible with law. 124 In the context of immigration proceedings against a parent, 
the views of a child would be relevant, but not to the extent it precluded operation 
of the law. Therefore if a child wanted to stay in New Zealand, this would be 
considered against the State's right to remove the illegal immigrant parents. 
In the immigration setting the parents are relying on the rights of New Zealand 
citizen children as a basis for the family to remain in New Zealand. Therefore the 
rights of the children are to be invoked by another. 
l What are the rights of New Zealand citizen children in the immigration 
context? 
The rights of the New Zealand citizen children were primarily discussed in Part 
III. Firstly by virtue of their citizenship they have a "right to be in New Zealand at 
any time." 125 This is reinforced by Section 3(3) of the Immigration Act 1987 that 
states New Zealand citizens cannot be subject to removal, which means the 
children have a right to residence in New Zealand. 126 The children also have those 
rights encapsulated in the ICCPR and CRC, because the NZIS recognises that 
these obligations must be taken into account. 127 
2 Have these rights been breached? 
If children are 'removed' from New Zealand with their illegal immigrant parents, 
this is in effect a breach of their right to be in New Zealand at any time. 
122 Young,aboven 119, 180. 
123 Louise Ackers "From ' Best Interests ' to Pa11icipatory Rights - Children's Involvement in 
Family Migration Decisions" (2000) 12 CFLQ 167, 169. 
124 Ackers, aboven 123,167. 
125 Inunigration Act 1987 s 3( 1 ). 
126 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 s 18(1). 
127 NZIS, above n 5, D4.45a. 
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The children have been forced to leave New Zealand by a decision to remove their 
overstaying parents. However, the courts have stated that the parents are subject to 
the removal order and hence have a choice whether to take their children with 
them.128 If the parents choose not to take their children then those children can 
remain in New Zealand and their right is fulfilled. If however the parents decide to 
take the children with them, that is the parents' choice for their children and would 
not be a breach of the children's rights by the State, although the right cannot be 
enjoyed at present, it is because of a private family decision. The State can stand 
by its decision. 
The children still have the right to come to New Zealand and the right to residence. 
This can be invoked later in life, when the child can decide their own actions -
where they are going to live. In this regard the right to be in New Zealand at any 
time can be held by children but not enforced. Their parents who have the capacity 
to decide on a place of residence must make the choice. 
Children also have those protections in the ICCPR and CRC, that is the right to 
family protection, to acquire a nationality and have their best interests considered. 
The rights in these texts are not breached if the NZIS has considered the 
application of the texts in a decision.129 
Prima facie the rights of children in immigration cases have not been breached if a 
decision is made by the NZIS by referring to the ICCPR and the CRC that results 
in the children leaving New Zealand with their illegal immigrant parents. For 
"[ e Jven people who are sympathetic to their plight have felt that 'the law must be 
upheld' and .. . 'we cannot tolerate the open flouting of our immigration laws. "' 130 
This represents the current sentiment of the courts, the NZIS and the New Zealand 
128 As in Schier, above n 23, 706 and Elika , above n 18, 748 . 
129 As required in Tavita , above n 3, 266. 
130J de Bres and R Campbell The Overstayers (Auckland Resource Centre for World Development, 
Auckland, 1976) 14. 
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public. The law must be upheld even if New Zealand citizens must leave New 
Zealand, this is a harsh reality but the only sensible result in most cases. 
B The State as Rights Holder 
It is strange to record the State as a holder of rights, given the discussion about 
rights as protection for those in a vulnerable position. The State has discretion, 
which it gains from representing the general populace. 131 The State holds the rights 
of society in a general sense and invokes them against others. It is power to make 
decisions that is relevant in the immigration context. 
The State delegates the power of decision making to relevant state agencies. In the 
immigration setting this will be the NZIS. The NZIS then has the power granted by 
the Immigration Act 1987 and their own immigration policy guidelines, 
specifically to decide who can reside in New Zealand. 132 This right must be 
balanced against the rights of New Zealand citizen children to remain in New 
Zealand. 
The right of residence to a country 1s a fundamental government policy 
consideration. The State has an important right to decide New Zealand's 
immigration policy. It would not be acceptable if residence was granted to parents 
as of right, just because of a New Zealand born child. The child's citizenship 
would be one consideration in the process. 133 It is unfortunate that a New Zealand 
citizen by birth is forced to leave New Zealand, but represents the cmTent problem 
in immigration. The right of the State to grant or deny residence ranks in front of 
the right of New Zealand born children to remain in New Zealand with their illegal 
immigrant parents. 
131 Schneider, above 11 17, 52. 
132 NZIS, above 11 5, D4.45.5b. 
133 McLeod, above n 63, 16. 
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Inherent in this discussion is the opposite to the rights of the State - the 
obligations. The ZIS is predominately the body that fulfills these obligations. 
There is an obligation to take account of the IC CPR and the CRC and consider the 
situation of the children when executing removal wanants. Since these obligations 
interfere in the lives of citizens the interventions must be clearly defined so that 
the power used is predictable. 134 This has been satisfied by recognition of the 
obligations in the policy guidelines. 135 The NZIS must examine the ICCPR and the 
CRC and assess the impact ofremoval on the New Zealand citizen children. If this 
is satisfied then the decision of the NZIS can stand and the obligation has been 
fulfilled. Unless there is a gross error in the decision making process the courts are 
reluctant to interfere. 
I The State as rights holder for New Zealand society 
The preceding discussion presumed that the State could hold rights for society in 
general. In this sense, the NZIS determines residency and in tum fosters national 
unity on behalf of the rest of New Zealand. The right of society to live and enjoy 
life in New Zealand is affected by immigration, which is why the Government sets 
immigration targets. There are limited resources which must be shared amongst all 
of New Zealand. Permission for illegal immigrants to remain in New Zealand will 
affect resource allocation. Therefore in order to promote the rights of all New 
Zealand, the NZIS must follow the immigration targets when deciding residency 
of illegal immigrants, who must then decide for their children's future. 
Ultimately New Zealand society would bear the burden for the New Zealand 
citizen children if they were allowed to remain in New Zealand. At the extreme 
case this would mean providing for social welfare benefits and in most cases the 
provision of public education and health care. Taxpayers contribute to social 
services through income tax and other citizens forgo benefits in favour of those 
134 Eekelaar, above n 48, 268. 
135 NZIS, above n 5, D4.4S.S. 
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more in need. One should remember the words of Cooke P in Tavita that "her [the 
child's) future as a New Zealand citizen is inevitably a responsibility of this 
country." 136 Most of New Zealand society could justify extending limited 
resources and support to New Zealand citizens by birth, but many would not feel 
the same towards illegal immigrants, the parents. There is justification in enforcing 
the Immigration Act 1987 and removing illegal immigrants. If the decision of the 
parents was for their children to remain in New Zealand then the State would have 
an obligation to support them. These obligations would stem from domestic and 
international Jaw, as children within the jurisdiction. 
C Parents as Rights Holders 
The parents, the illegal immigrants, do have rights. The right to fair process and of 
appeal. These are recognised in the Immigration Act 1987. The rights of the illegal 
immigrants will be subordinate to the right of the State to determine who can 
reside in New Zealand. The parents initially came to New Zealand as visitors and 
remained in New Zealand illegally, they have no right to stay in New Zealand, and 
it is not unduly harsh for them to return to their home country.137 This result is 
sensible as any other conclusion would frustrate the intention of Parliament and 
the Immigration Act 1987. Illegal immigrants are not in a special position just 
because of their New Zealand born children. If this were the proposition it would 
create inequities between the rights of other illegal immigrants. Therefore the only 
relevant right for the parents in the immigration context is the right to be heard. 
The balance between the State and parent, through the child is towards the State. 
Illegal immigrant parents also have obligations. Given a decision to remove them 
from New Zealand, the parents must decide the outcome for their children. This is 
the responsibility of the family. 138 The decision is whether to leave the children in 
New Zealand or to take them to their own home country. There is no check on this 
136 Ta vita, above n 3, 266. 
137 Pu/i 'uvea, above n 15 , 325 . 
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obligation by the State; it is a final choice. The fact there is no check is strange, 
given the requirement to account for the needs of the child in a decision to remove 
parents. However, the decision of the parents would be a private decision and 
unless there were serious human rights issues, the decision is beyond the review of 
the court. 
In summary, vanous groups have rights in removal actions in the immigration 
context. New Zealand citizen children have rights of residence in New Zealand. 
They are not breached when their illegal immigrant parents are removed from New 
Zealand. The rights of the children can still be exercised later in life. In this sense 
the rights of the State to determine their residence policy remain dominant, which 
is justified. 
VI CHANGES TO POLICY 
It has become apparent that more and more temporary entrants are coming to New 
Zealand. Within this group many become illegal immigrants. Estimated figures 
indicate that the number of overstayers is currently 20,700. Of this group 6,800 
people have been in New Zealand for more than five years. 139 In numerous cases 
children are born in New Zealand and receive birthright citizenship. This system 
needs addressing before the situation grows to unmanageable proportions. Indeed, 
tougher immigration laws and an amnesty for overstayers were introduced on 1 
October 2000 to deal with the problem of illegal immigrants. 140 The huge number 
of overstayers eventuates because of the birthright citizenship rule and the delay in 
identifying and removing illegal immigrants. Solutions and alternatives to these 
policies will be examined. 
138 Ian Hassall "New Zealand Courts and the UN Convention - Tavita" (1993) 11 Children 6. 
139 "Last-chance amnesty for overstayers", above n 2. 
140 "Islanders 'not all overstayers '" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 16 August 2000, 18. 
46 
A Birthright Citizenship 
New Zealand, along with many other countries, gives citizenship to anyone born 
within its territories. 141 This system has also worked well in the United States for 
centuries. However during recent years, conditions in foreign countries have 
worsened and means of travel have become more accessible. There has been an 
incentive to breach immigration laws for a better future. 142 These factors also 
apply to New Zealand. 
I The problems with birthright citizenship 
Firstly "it might be asked why it is that children born in this country [the United 
States] to parents who enter without permission or for short-term visits should be 
citizens from birth." 143 Temporary entrants and illegal immigrants know they must 
sometime leave the country. Children will inevitably also have to leave if their 
parents are removed; therefore citizenship should not be given to those born to 
illegal immigrants or short-term entrants. 
When citizenship is given to children of illegal immigrants or temporary entrants 
and their parents must leave New Zealand it is defacto removal of the children. 
There is still a right of re-entry available to the children and possibly the parents as 
well , on family reunification grounds. This allows previous illegal immigrants to 
return to New Zealand because of a situation that occurred when they were in New 
Zealand illegally, which is unsatisfactory for immigration policy. Additionally the 
children can receive social welfare and other benefits because of their New 
Zealand citizenship. Another problem is the incentive for temporary entrants to 
ignore the immigration laws and remain in New Zealand to have children. It may 
lead to exploitation of children and women to secure an advantage in the 
141 Citizenship Act 1977 s 6(1). 
142 "Mexican Women Cross Border so Babies can be US Citizens" New York Times, New York, 
United States, 21 November 1982, I. 
143 Guendelsberger, above n 73, 379. 
47 
immigration process. 144 This result would also breach fundamental human rights 
and not be desirable in society. 
National unity would be strengthened if citizenship were not given to children 
born to illegal aliens or temporary entrants. 145 This would protect the rights of 
society to live and enjoy life in New Zealand. However the difficulty is identifying 
viable alternatives, as there are also problems with the solutions to birthright 
citizenship. 
2 The solutions to birthright citizenship 
If the birthright citizenship rule were no longer applied in New Zealand some other 
alternative would have to be formulated. It is useful to look at what is set forth in 
the French Nationality Code 1973. 
The Code provides that children born in France to parents who were also born in 
France (or former French Colonies) would be given citizenship. 146 If one parent 
was born in France, then French citizenship could be chosen by the child under 
Article 24. Neither Article would apply to the children in the cases discussed, as 
the parents were not born in New Zealand. If a child was born in France to foreign 
parents, the child could choose French citizenship at majority (or some younger 
age) if the child had resided in France for five years. 147 The parent's immigration 
status is in-elevant. The choice to attain citizenship is a viable alternative as it 
requires a residency period. However a child can fulfill this requirement while 
their parents are illegal immigrants, this defeats the purpose of a solution to the 
birthright citizenship rule. 
144 Butler and Butler, above n 114, 264. 
145 Guendelsberger, above n 73, 411 . 
146 French Nationality Code 1973 art 6 and art 23. 
147 
French Nationality Code 1973 art 44, ati 52, art 53 and art 54. 
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What then happens to the child's citizenship prior to them fulfilling the five-year 
residency requirement? The child could take the same citizenship as their parents 
hold . This is dependent on the parent ' s home nation recognising citizenship to 
those born outside the territory. If this does not happen, the child would be 
stateless which would be far worse than the immigration problem at present and 
breach international obligations. 148 
Another problem is that the removal of illegal immigrant parents could also 
preclude the child from acquiring citizenship. If parents were removed then the 
five-year residency requirement could not be met. This also would create a 
stateless child. 
Another feature of the French system is that parents of French citizen children 
cannot be removed even if they are illegal immigrants. Once a child has chosen 
French citizenship the illegal immigrant parents can also reside in France. This 
means that a lot more immigrants would have the incentive to have children in the 
territory, as was feared after the Tavita decision. 149 This is not a good solution and 
would escalate the number of illegal immigrants. 
The problems with administering the French system would be in determining the 
country of parent's birth. Delays would occur while documents were traced, 
leaving a child ' s citizenship status in limbo which would breach the CRC as the 
child would not have an identity. 150 Therefore the birthright rule is much easier to 
apply than any alternative. 151 Even the French alternative would not solve the 
immigration problem by discouraging illegal immigrants. 
A second alternative is to retain the birthright citizenship rule, except for those 
children born to illegal immigrants or temporary entrants. Children born in New 
148 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art 7. 
149 Butler and Butler, above n 114, 264 . 
150 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art 7. 
151 Guendelsberger, above n 73, 424. 
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Zealand would be granted citizenship, except if their parents were illegal 
immigrants or temporary entrants. This again is fraught with problems. Illegal 
immigrants remain undetected for so long, 152 again a stateless child would be 
created. The alternative also provides an incentive not to register births, breaching 
Article 7 of the CRC, for fear of being identified as an illegal immigrant. A related 
problem is proving parentage of children. If one parent is unknown then a sound 
decision could not be made. If one parent is an illegal immigrant and the other is 
legally in New Zealand, then treatment would be inconsistent. Citizenship would 
be granted to children of an illegal immigrant which is contrary to the alternative 
policy of not conferring citizenship to the children of illegal immigrants or 
temporary entrants. The overarching problem with this alternative is that children 
are treated differently because of the actions of their parents. They did not choose 
to be born to illegal immigrants, their situation is precarious and they should be 
protected. The best protection is citizenship. 
3 Do these alternatives solve the immigration problem ? 
The French system and the second alternative would not solve the problem of the 
huge number of illegal immigrants. Indeed the alternatives may even accentuate 
the problem, because the process would be more drawn out. Parentage would have 
to be proven, documents traced and citizenship choices made by the child. Either 
system would require additional administration. A problem does exist in this area 
and because of the importance of immigration policy and the equal importance of 
protecting children's rights, the issue should be considered by Parliament by 
drafting legislation to address the increasing immigration levels and children born 
in New Zealand to illegal immigrants.153 
152 Mrs Elika was in New Zealand for eight years and the Puli 'uveas for six years before being 
detected. 
153 Judge J Daniel Dowell, Judge Philip J Motante Jr, Judge Ira Sandron and Judge Jose Simonet 
"Protection and Custody of Children in US Immigration Court Proceedings" ( 1992) 16 Nova L Rev 
1285, 1296. 
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B Immigration Policy 
In the current situation many illegal immigrants remam undetected for years. 
Recent figures suggest that 33 per cent of overstayers have been in New Zealand 
for more than five years. 154 Reviews, court decisions and appeals further draw out 
the process. The situation needs to be reviewed to ensure that it does not become 
worse, with more New Zealand citizen children leaving New Zealand when their 
illegal immigrant parents are removed. 
1 Alternatives for change 
Firstly, there needs to be a tougher enforcement of permit rules. Reminders must 
sent to immigrants that their permits are soon to expire and the consequences of 
remaining in New Zealand. Additional information should be placed on 
applications about the significance of remaining in New Zealand unlawfully. The 
NZIS will also enforce permit expiration rules in a more stringent manner. 
Hence illegal immigrants will not be given the incentive to stay in New Zealand 
and in tum have children. Currently for illegal immigrants 155 
[t]he key to success, it seems, is to ensure the application process is as drawn out 
as long as possible and, when the final appeal fails , lie low long enough to 
become part of the scenery. 
If illegal immigrants are allowed to remain in New Zealand for long periods of 
time it escalates the problem and makes it even harder to leave, as there are 
children born in New Zealand. For example in the case of Mrs Elika, she had been 
in New Zealand unlawfully for ten years. This delay provides the opportunity for 
154 "Last-chance amnesty for overstayers", above n 2. 
155 "Ignoring the rnles works in the end" Waikato Times, Hamilton, New Zealand, 10 April 2000, 
6. 
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children to be born in New Zealand. The consequence is that parents must make 
difficult choices for their children's future, which is an unsatisfactory situation. 
During 1997 there were 20,000 overstayers in New Zealand. However only seven 
per cent actually received removal notices and only four per cent subsequently 
departed New Zealand. 156 Therefore there needs to be a more consistent approach 
to the enforcement of the immigration law, specifically execution of removal 
orders. 
Toughening up of immigration law was introduced on 1 October 2000. Removal 
notices can now be served on illegal immigrants and they can then be removed that 
day. 157 This change is specifically in response to the high number of illegal 
immigrants. Previously illegal immigrants had a right to appeal within 42 days. 
The right to appeal ensures all aspects of the case are dealt with, including the 
rights of New Zealand citizen children. This delay of 42 days does draw out the 
process, but removal on the same day is too harsh. Proper arrangements could not 
be made on the same day. Time should be given to ensure that affected parties can 
take action and children can be properly cared for. However illegal immigrants 
know they must leave New Zealand and should do so when detected. The problem 
is that families are involved and the State is obligated to ensure the children's 
welfare is accounted for. 
An amnesty for overstayers was also announced in conjunction with the new laws 
introduced on l October 2000. From that date until 31 March 2001 well settled 
overstayers can apply for a two-year work permit and later New Zealand 
residency. Well-settled overstayers include "overstayers who [have] been in New 
156 "Overstayer law cruel for children", above n 70. 
157 "Inm1igration cleans up for law change" Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 19 June 2000, 
3. 
52 
Zealand for more than five years, [are] married to or in a relationship with a Kiwi, 
or [have] a New Zealand-born child".158 
This amnesty is a complete policy change. Those illegal immigrants who have 
evaded removal for more than five years will be rewarded by being allowed to 
remain in New Zealand. If they have New Zealand born children then this will 
increase their chances ofremaining in New Zealand. The policy is too sympathetic 
for those who have blatantly broken immigration laws. The purpose of the amnesty 
is to allow those who are assimilated in New Zealand society to remain in New 
Zealand society. But they would not be in this situation if they had left New 
Zealand on expiration of their permits. 
The overall benefit of the amnesty is that New Zealand born children get to stay in 
New Zealand and retain their family unity. This is great for those illegal 
immigrants still in New Zealand; but for those recently removed it is not much use. 
Once the amnesty is over then there is no relief for illegal immigrants, they can be 
removed the day they are identified. This immigration policy is inconsistent over 
time and will not solve the problem of reducing the number of illegal immigrants. 
Although the number of current illegal immigrants will be reduced because they 
will be entitled to work permits and to be in New Zealand lawfully. 
The only effective result is for the Government to issue a statement that New 
Zealand born children do not guarantee a right to stay in New Zealand, they are 
one consideration in the process. Failure to do this may put false hope into the 
minds of desperate people or lead to exploitation. 
Yet there are still the exceptional cases, which when introduced to the media 
produce results beneficial for the children. The Mila family from Tonga had been 
overstayers for nearly a decade, and some of their children had been born in New 
158 "Thousands in hiding get chance to stay on" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 20 
September 2000, 1. 
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Zealand. The family could apply for residence because the case hit the media and 
the Minister of Immigration Lianne Dalziel took action. 159 Like the amnesty the 
treatment of the Mila family is an inconsistent application of immigration policy, 
and other illegal immigrants can be justified in concluding that treatment has been 
unequal. 
2 Do these alternatives solve the immigration problem? 
These alternatives will reduce the number of illegal immigrants in New Zealand, 
as more will be removed sooner. However it will not reduce the number of New 
Zealand citizen children removed with their parents. In fact the number of children 
removed from New Zealand is likely to increase, because there would not be 
adequate time to find suitable alternative care for them. 
The amnesty will make illegal immigrants legal temporary entrants and give their 
New Zealand born children the right to stay in New Zealand with their parents. 
This does not solve the overall problem of illegal immigrants, but enhances the 
rights of the children. 
It appears the only solution is to change the mindset of immigrants, that temporary 
entry means temporary entry and that they and other dependent family members 
must leave New Zealand. This removal does not infringe any rights, but is a 
consequence of temporary entry. 
VII CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, children who are born in New Zealand have the right to remain in 
New Zealand because of their citizenship. Their parents do not have this right. 
These children also have the rights contained in the ICCPR and the CRC. The best 
159 "Ignoring the rules works in the end", above n 155. 
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interests of the child and the right to family unity must be considered by the NZIS 
when the removal of their illegal immigrant parents is determined. These rights are 
balanced against the rights of the State to detem1ine who resides in New Zealand. 
The balance that has been struck favours the State. This means that the parents are 
removed from New Zealand and the parents then must decide whether to take their 
children with them. This is a family choice and is divorced from the decisions 
made by the State. Therefore the children's rights are not breached by the State can 
still be relied on later in life. 
The current situation means that New Zealand citizen children are in fact removed 
from New Zealand. The solution to this problem is to change the birthright 
citizenship rule or to take a tougher line on illegal immigrants. However these also 
have problems in the theory and application of these solutions. The only solution is 
the realisation that New Zealand citizen children do not guarantee a right to stay in 
New Zealand and in most instances they must leave when their parents are 
removed. Although this result is harsh, it is justified to maintain the validity of 
immigration laws. Therefore children born to illegal immigrants must leave New 
Zealand if their parents are removed and they decide to take the children with 
them, there is no recourse from this decision. 
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